We consider a general equilibrium climate change model with two endogenous R&D sectors. First, we characterize the set of decentralized equilibria: to each vector of public tools a carbon tax and a subsidy to each R&D sector is associated a particular equilibrium. Second, we compute the optimal tools. Third, we perform various second-best analysis by imposing some constraints on one or several policy.
Introduction
The basic approach to examine interactions between energy, climate and economic growth is called the "top-down" approach. The objective is to analyze the impact of several technological options or policies, such as CO 2 taxation or quotas, by providing a theoretically consistent description of the general economic system. 1 A large number of top-down models have been already developed: DICE (Nordhaus, 2008) , ENTICE-BR (Popp, 2006a (Popp, , 2006b ), MIND (Edenhofer et al., 2005 (Edenhofer et al., , 2006 , DEMETER (Gerlagh and van Der Zwaan, 2006), WITCH (Bosetti et al., 2006) ... Nevertheless, whatever are their degree of sophistication, those models exclusively focus on the rst-best optimum by determining the temporal trajectories which maximize the social welfare subject to a set of technological and climatic constraints. Sometimes, additional constraints are added, as in Popp (2006a) where the results of a simulated optimal carbon tax without research subsidy are presented. However, to our knowledge, the basic problem of a policy-maker facing the agent behaviors in a decentralized economy is generally neither formalized nor analyzed.
In the real world, it can be impossible to reach the rst-best optimum for many reasons.
Some of them are standard in the literature, as the existence of ex-ante distortionnary taxes in the system (Sandmo, 1975) , or the restriction to linear taxes. For instance, Cremer et al. (2001) study how second-best considerations change the level of the optimal tax on a polluting good, but in a static model. In this paper, we assume that budgetary, socioeconomic or political constraints, without no more specication, can obstruct the enforcement of the rst-best policies. As an illustration, consider a policy-maker who is restricted on the number and/or the level of policy tools among the vector of all the instruments he can spare. This case occurs if, for instance, the environmental tax and/or some research subsidies are set below their rst-best levels. The policy-maker can thus only play with the remaining unconstrained tools in order to maximize the social welfare.
The basic point is that the structure of the decentralized economy becomes an additional constraint for him and then, he can only reach a second-best optimum.
Before conducting a second-best analysis, it is thus necessary to characterize the set of equilibria: to each vector of economic policy tools, one associates a particular equilibrium.
Hence, if some of these tools are constrained, the policy-maker determines the other(s) in order to maximize the welfare in the remaining sub-set of equilibria.
The general equilibrium approach makes feasible any second-best analysis, but it also has several other advantages. First, it allows to analyze the dissociated impacts of various policy tools on the time pace of prices and quantities. For instance, one can study the consequences of a change in the carbon tax, the other tools being given. Second, it allows to understand the role of prices as channels by which policy tools act on the economy.
Third, it permits to avoid the inaccuracies inherent in any partial equilibrium analysis, as for instance the ones implied by the use of the standard cost-benet approach when the policy (or project) choices lead to more than marginal perturbations (see Dietz et al., 2008, for the special case of climate change mitigation policies).
The objective of this paper is to propose a methodological framework to perform secondbest analysis in an endogenous growth/climate change model. More precisely, we study of the set of equilibria in the decentralized economy. The main diculty of this approach lies in the way the research activity is modeled, in particular the type of innovation goods which are developed, as well as their pricing. In the standard endogenous growth theory (Aghion and Howitt, 1998; Romer, 1990 ...), the production of an innovation is associated with a particular intermediate good. However, embodying knowledge into intermediate goods usually becomes inextricable in more general computable endogenous growth models with pollution and/or natural resources. In addition, those technical diculties are emphasized when several research sectors are under consideration, i.e. when there exists several types of specic knowledge, each of them being dedicated to a particular input (resource, labor, capital, backstop...), as it is proposed in Acemoglu (2002) . To circumvent those obstacles, we assume that the pieces of knowledge are directly priced (see for instance Grimaud and Rougé, 2008) . We compute the social and the market values of an innovation and we suppose that the policy-maker can reduce the gap between these two values owing to dedicated R&D subsidies.
We develop a model, based on Popp (2006a) , in which energy services are provided by a bundle of two primary energies: a polluting non-renewable resource, e.g. fossil fuels, and a carbon-free substitute called backstop (solar, wind...). 2 We introduce two R&D sectors. The rst one improves the eciency of energy production, the second one, the eciency of the backstop. Then, we have to consider two types of market failures: the 2 The use of the term "backstop" in this case is due to Popp (2006a) , but it is a slight abuse of language since the two kinds of resource can be used simultaneously. A more standard denition refers to a technological breakthrough that drives the traditional fossil energy obsolete and that replaces this former by a clean renewable source.
pollution from the fossil resource use and the research spillovers in each R&D sector. In the decentralized equilibrium, we thus introduce two kinds of economic policy instruments in accordance: an environmental tax on the carbon emissions and a research subsidy for the energy and backstop sectors. As a result, there exists a continuum of equilibria, each one being associated to a particular vector of instruments. Clearly, when the public instruments are optimally set, the equilibrium of the decentralized economy coincides with the rst best optimum.
We obtain numerical results that highlight the role of the research grants, in particular the backstop ones. The model shows that the best way to mitigate climate change is to implement a policy that combine both a carbon tax and a green research subsidy. However, the carbon tax penalizes the consumption and then, the welfare of earlier generations, whereas the research subsidy allows to spare them.
The article is organized as follows. In section 2, we sketch the model and present the decentralized economy. We also solve the equilibrium. In section 3, we characterize the rst-best optimal solutions and we compute the optimal policy tools that implement it.
In section 4, we analyze a selection of second-best cases and we illustrate numerically our main results. We conclude in section 5.
The decentralized economy
The model is mainly based on the DICE-07 and the ENTICE-BR models (Nordhaus, 2008 and Popp, 2006a, respectively). We consider a worldwide decentralized economy containing four production sectors: nal output, energy services and two primary energy inputs, namely a fossil fuel and a carbon-free backstop (cf. gure 1). The fossil fuel (e.g. rening industry in the case of oil) is obtained from a non-renewable resource whose combustion yields carbon emissions. Those emissions accumulate into the atmosphere and bring about an increase of the mean atmospheric temperature. Retrospectively, global warming imposes some penalties on society. As in Nordhaus (2007 and , we assume here that these penalties take the form of a damage function aecting the level of nal output, instead of the consumer's utility. The production of nal energy services and backstop requires specic knowledges provided by two specic R&D sectors. We assume that all sectors, except R&D sectors, are perfectly competitive. Population, i.e. labor supply, grows exogenously. Production is represented by the same modied production function than in Nordhaus (2008) . We assume that global warming aects the economy through the nal output such that, when the average temperature increase is T t , the instantaneous penalty rate
At each time t, the production of nal output is D(T t )Q t , where Q t is given by the following constant-return-to-scale Cobb-Douglas production function:
in which K t , E t , L t and A t denote the stock of capital, the ow of energy services, the labor force and the total productivity of factors (i.e. a Hicks-neutral technological change), respectively. We assume that L t and A t are exogenously given: 
Denoting respectively by p E,t , w t , r t and δ the price of energy services, the real wage, the interest rate and the depreciation rate of capital, and normalizing the output price to one, the instantaneous prot of the nal output producer writes 4 :
At each time t, the program of the nal output producer consists in choosing K t , E t and L t that maximizes Π Q t , subject to (1). The rst order conditions are:
where J X stands for the partial derivative of function J(.) with respect to X.
The nal energy sector
We use the energy production function introduced by Popp (2006a and 2006b) . At each time t, the production of a ow of energy services E t depends both on a bundle of imperfect substitute primary energies and on technical change:
where F t is the fossil fuel input, B t is a carbon-free energy source, namely the "backstop",
and H E,t represents a stock of specic technological knowledge dedicated to energy eciency. Denoting by p F,t and p B,t the prices of fossil fuel and backstop and by τ t the carbon tax, assumed here to be additive, the energy producer must chooses F t and B t at each time (5) . Note that, because of the carbon tax, the fuel price paid by the rm, i.e. p F,t + τ t , is larger than the selling price p F,t , i.e. the price which is received by the resource-holder. The rst order conditions 3 As in Nordhaus (2008) , the TFP growth is exogenous in order to circumvent the large source of uncertainty on its projection. It is assumed to slow gradually over the next three centuries until eventually stopping. The same trajectory shape also apply for the labor force, i.e. the population. Long-term projections of the United Nations predict a declining growth rate so that total population approaches a limit of 8.6 billion. 4 We assume here that the representative household holds the capital and rents it to rms at the rental price pK,t. Standard arbitrage conditions imply pK,t = rt + δ.
write:
2.1.3 The fossil fuel sector
The fossil fuel "production/extraction" function is derived from the Popp's extraction cost function (Popp, 2006a) . We assume that it depends on a stock of carbon-based nonrenewable resource and on specic productive investment (Grimaud et al., 2007) :
where Q F,t is the amount of nal product devoted to the production/extraction of fossil fuel and Z t , Z t ≡ t 0 F s ds, is the cumulative extraction of the exhaustible resource from the initial date up to t, withZ: Z t ≤Z, ∀t ≥ 0. Then, the fuel supply is constrained by the resource scarcity. The instantaneous prot of the fuel producer is: (8). Denoting by η t the multiplier associated with the state equation, static and dynamic rst order conditions are:
together with the transversality condition lim t→∞ η t Z t = 0. Integrating (10) and using (9) , it comes:
which reads as a specic version of the standard Hotelling rule in the case of an extraction technology given by function (8).
The backstop sector
Similarly to the fossil fuel technology, the backstop production function is also based on the corresponding cost function used by Popp (2006a) . This technology requires some specic investment and knowledge:
where Q B,t is the amount of nal product that is devoted to the backstop production sector and H B,t is the stock of knowledge pertaining to the backstop. At each time t, the backstop producer maximizes its prot Π B t = [p B,t B t − Q B,t ], subject to (12) , which implies the following rst order condition:
2.1.5 The R&D sectors
There are two stocks of knowledge, H E and H B , each associated with a specic R&D sector (i.e. the energy and the backstop ones). We consider that each innovation is a non-rival, indivisible and innitely durable piece of knowledge (for instance, a scientic report, a data base, a software algorithm...) which is simultaneously used by the sector which produces the good i and the R&D sector i, i = {B, E}.
Here, an innovation is not directly embodied into tangible intermediate goods and thus, it cannot be nanced by the sale of these goods. However, in order to fully describe the equilibrium, we need to nd a way to assess the price received by the inventor for each piece of knowledge. We proceed as follows: i) In each research sector, we determine the social value of an innovation. Since an innovation is a public good, this social value is the sum of marginal protabilities of this innovation in all sectors which use it. If the inventor was able to extract the willingness to pay of each user, he would receive this social value and the rst best optimum would be implemented. ii) In reality, there are some distortions that constrain the inventor to extract only a part of this social value 5 . This implies that the market value (without subsidy) is lower than the social one. iii) The research sectors are eventually subsidized in order to reduce the gap between the social and the market values of innovations.
Let us apply this three-steps procedure to the R&D sector i, i = {B, E}. Each innovation produced by this sector is used by the R&D sector i itself as well as by the production technology of good i. Thus, at each date t, the instantaneous social value of
H i ,t are the marginal protabilities of this innovation in the production and R&D sectors i, respectively. The social value of this innovation at t isV H i ,t = ∞ tv H i ,s e − s t rxdx ds. We assume that, without any public intervention, only a share γ i of the social value is paid to the innovator, with 0 < γ i < 1.
However, the government can decide to grant this R&D sector by applying a non-negative subsidy rate σ i,t . Note that if σ i,t = 1 − γ i , the market value matches the social one. The instantaneous market value (including subsidy) is:
and the market value at date t is:
Note that dierentiating (15) with respect to time leads to the usual arbitrage relation:
which reads as the equality between the rate of return on the nancial market and the rate of return on the R&D sector i.
We can now analyze the behaviors of the R&D sectors. The dynamics of the stock of knowledge in sector i is governed by the following innovation function
where a i > 0, and
i.e. the amount of nal output that is devoted to R&D sector i. At each time t, each sector i, i = {B, E}, supplies the ow of innovationsḢ i,t at price V H i ,t and demands some specic investment R i,t at price 1, so that the prot function to be maximized is
The rst order condition implies: ∂Π
The marginal protability for specic knowledge of R&D sector i is:
Finally, in order to determine the social and the market values of an innovation in all research sectors, we need to know the marginal protabilities of innovations in the backstop and the energy production sectors. From the expressions of Π B t and Π E t , those values are given respectively byv B
Therefore, the instantaneous market values (including subsidies) of innovations are:
2.1.6 The household and the government
We use the same CES utility function U (.) than Nordhaus (2008) . The social welfare function is thus dened as:
where C t is the aggregate consumption, ρ, ρ > 0, is the (constant) social rate of time preferences and , > 0, is the elasticity of marginal utility. The households maximize W subject to the following budget constraint:
where I t is the instantaneous investment in capital dened by I t =K t + δK t , Π t is the total prots gained in the economy and T a t is a lump-sum tax (subsidy-free) that allows to balance the budget constraint of the government. This maximization leads to the following condition:
Assuming that the government's budget constraint holds at each time t (i.e. sum of the various taxes equal R&D subsidies), then it writes:
Finally, remark that expanding
into (23) and replacing T a t by its value coming from (25), we obtain:
thus verifying that the nal output is devoted to the aggregated consumption, the fossil fuel production, the backstop production, the investment in capital, and in the two R&D sectors.
The environment
Pollution is generated by fossil fuel burning. Let ξ, ξ > 0, be the unitary carbon content of fossil fuel, G 0 the stock of carbon in the atmosphere at the beginning of the planning period, G t the stock at time t and ζ, ζ > 0, the natural rate of decay. As in the DICE-07 model (Nordhaus, 2008) , the atmospheric carbon concentration does not directly enter the damage function. In fact, the increase in carbon concentration drives the global mean temperature away from a given state here the 1900 level and the dierence between this state and the present global mean temperature is taken as an index of climate change. Let T t denote this dierence. Then, the climatic dynamic system is captured by the following two state equations:
Function Φ(.), which links the atmospheric carbon concentration to the dynamics of temperature, is in fact the reduced form of a more complex function that takes into account the inertia of the climate dynamics (i.e. the radiative forcing, see Nordhaus 2008) 6 .
Characterization of the decentralized equilibrium
From the previous analysis of individual behaviors, we can now characterize the set of equilibria, which is done by the following proposition:
Proposition 1 For a given triplet of policies {σ B,t , σ E,t , τ t } ∞ t=0 , the equilibrium conditions can be summed up as follows: 6 In the analytical treatment of the model, we assume, for the sake of clarity, that the carbon cycle through atmosphere and oceans as well as the dynamic interactions between atmospheric and oceanic temperatures, are captured by the reduced form (27) and (28). Goulder and Mathai (2000) , or Kriegler and Bruckner (2004) , have recourse to such simplied dynamics. From the DICE-99 model, the formers estimate parameters ξ and ζ that take into account the inertia of the climatic system. They state that only 64% of current emissions actually contribute to the augmentation of atmospheric CO2 and that the portion of current CO2 concentration in excess is removed naturally at a rate of 0.8% per year. However, in the numerical simulations, we adopt the full characterization of the climate dynamics from the 2007 version of DICE (Nordhaus, 2008) .
Proof. See Appendix A1.
A particular equilibrium is associated with a given triplet of policies {τ t , σ B,t , σ E,t } ∞ t=0
and the set of equations given by Proposition 1 allows to compute the quantities for this equilibrium. The corresponding prices r * t , w * t , p * E,t , p * F,t , p * B,t and V * H i ,t are given by (2), (4), (3), (11), (13) and (18), respectively. If the triplet of policy tools is optimally chosen, this set of equations characterizes the rst-best optimum, together with the system of prices that implement it. Note that we will get the same kind of conditions than the ones of Proposition 1 to characterize the rst-best optimum (cf. Proposition 2 below), so that we defer their interpretations to the next section.
3 Implementation of the rst-best optimum
The social planner problem consists in choosing {C t , Q B,t , Q F,t , R B,t , R E,t } ∞ t=0 that maximizes W , as dened by (22), subject to the output allocation constraint (26), the technological constraints (1), (5), (8) and (12), the environmental constraints (27) and (28), and, nally, the stock accumulation constraints (17), (23) andŻ t = F t . After eliminating the co-state variables, the rst order conditions reduce to the ve characteristic conditions of Proposition 2 below, which hold at each time t (we drop time subscripts for notational convenience).
Proposition 2 At each time t, the optimal solution is characterized by the following ve conditions:
Proof. See Appendix A2.
Equation (34) reads as a particular version of the Hotelling rule in this model, which
takes into account the carbon accumulation in the atmosphere, the dynamics of temperatures and their eects on the output. Equation (35) tells that the marginal productivity of specic input Q B,t equals its marginal cost. The three last equations are Keynes-Ramsey conditions. Equation (36) characterizes the optimal intertemporal trade-o between capital K t and consumption C t , as in standard growth models. Equation (37) (resp. (38)) characterizes the same kind of optimal trade-o between specic investment into backstop R&D sector, R B,t (resp. energy R&D sector, R E,t ) and consumption.
Recall that for a given set of public policies, a particular equilibrium is characterized by conditions (29)-(33) of Proposition 1. This equilibrium will be said to be optimal if it satises the optimum characterizing conditions (34)-(38) of Proposition 2. By analogy between these two sets of conditions, we can show that there exists a single triplet {σ B,t , σ E,t , τ t } ∞ t=0
that implements the optimum.
First, by comparing conditions (29) and (34), the optimal pollution tax can be identied as:
Next, the correspondence between the equilibrium characterizing condition (32) (resp. 
Proposition 3 The equilibrium dened in Proposition 1 is optimal if and only if the triplet of policies {σ
The optimal tax (39) requires some comments. Formally, this expression corresponds to the ratio between the marginal social cost of climate change the marginal damage in terms of utility coming from the consumption of an additional unit of fossil resource and the marginal utility of consumption. In other words, it is the environmental cost of one unit of fossil resource in terms of nal good: at date t, the increase by one unit of fossil fuel consumption, and then of carbon emissions, increases the stock of carbon in the atmosphere G t by an equivalent amount and rises the current temperature level by Φ (G t ). Since the environmental externality is captured here by a stock, and not a ow, this temperature change involves a unitary damage equal to ∞ t D (T s )Q s U (C s )e −(ρ+m)(s−t) ds, i.e. to the sum of the ow of marginal damages as measured in terms of utility, discounted at rate (ρ + m) in order to take into account the climatic inertia. The full marginal damage in terms of utility is obtained by multiplying this unitary damage by the eective change in temperature and by integrating this expression over time, with a discount rate equal to (ρ + ζ) to take into account the natural regeneration process of the atmosphere. Finally, in order to get a positive tax expressed in monetary value, we multiply the previous expression by −1/U (C), which yields expression (39).
Lastly, a worthwhile remark concerns the dynamic pace of such an optimal tax. By computing its growth rate, we can show that it is not necessary monotonous:
The rst term into brackets is strictly positive and works as the eective discount rate that takes into account the natural decarbonization rate of the atmosphere (i.e. the real interest rate r t = ρ−U /U augmented by ζ). belonging to the denition set Ω. For each equilibrium solution, one can compute the associated welfare value as a function of those public tools:
. When W is maximized simultaneously with respect to the three tools, one gets the rst-best optimum as described by Proposition 3:
Assume now that the social planner faces some constraints on her choices. For instance, she cannot subsidy research, or she cannot implement the rst-best carbon tax. In this case, she only uses the remaining unconstrained tool(s) to maximize the social welfare in the remaining sub-set of equilibria. Formally, if we denote by Θ ⊆ Ω this subset of constraints, then the second-best optimal policies are such that: τ sb t , σ sb B,t , σ sb
subject to {τ t , σ B,t , σ E,t } ∞ 0 ∈ Θ. Among the innity of possible second-best problems, we focus on the particular cases described in Table 1 .
First-best optimum
Second-best, no green R&D subs.
SB3 τ
Second-best, no energy R&D subs.
Second-best, no carbon tax In table 1, polar cases "FB" and "LF" refer to the rst-best and the laisser-faire, respectively. All the other cases are second-best analysis. "SB1" is the case where neither energy nor backstop R&D can be subsidized and it gives the associated second-best carbon tax τ sb1 t . "SB2" (resp. "SB3") is the case where the green (resp. energy) research cannot be granted, the other subsidy been set at its rst-best optimal level; the associated secondbest tax is denoted by τ sb2 t (resp. τ sb3 t ). Finally, "SB4" is the case where the fossil resource is not taxed at all.
4.2
Main results
Second-best instruments
The rst and second-best carbon taxes are depicted in Figure 2 (a). We can observe that when the social planner is not able to grant research at all, she must impose a higher carbon tax than the rst-best one: τ o t < τ sb1 t . In order to identify the relevant research sector to explain this result, we must look at "SB2" and "SB3". It appears that only green can be partially balanced by a higher carbon tax, but not an insucient σ E . To sum up, one gets:
In scenario SB4 (when the carbon tax is nil at each point of time), for computational convenience, we impose the two additional constraints that the subsidy rates are equal and constant over time. 7 Under these assumptions, we nd the following associated second-best R&D subsidies:
Policy eects on energy/climate
The ranking of the various taxes given in the previous subsection is transfered to the fossil fuel market prices, i.e. the selling prices including tax, as shown in Figure 2 (b):
If R&D subsidies would remain unchanged, this ranking of taxes and fossil prices would lead to a corresponding inverted ranking of the extraction trajectories. However, those subsidies are set to dierent levels in scenarios SB1 to SB4. That explains why, as shown in Figure 2 (c), the expected ranking is not observed. Indeed, we have (at least until the end of this century):
The rst inequality is the expected one: an increase in τ causes F to decrease. However, as compared to "FB", the carbon tax increases in "SB1" and "SB2", but the fossil fuel extraction ow also increases. This is due to the decrease in σ B when moving from FB to SB1 or SB2. As a result, the eect of the green research subsidy overrides the carbon tax one in that case. To go more into details, as long as the carbon is not taxed, R&D subsidies do not have any eect on fossil fuel use (LF versus SB4). When the tax becomes positive, F is reduced only if σ B is increased (from SB1 and SB3, τ decreases, σ E remains nil, σ B rises, but F diminishes). Conversely, an increase in σ E has not any impact on F (SB1 versus SB2).
From Figures 2(d) and 2(e)
, we observe that the carbon tax has a very weak eect on the backstop price and production, and on the green R&D (not shown). The basic relevant 7 For a discussion about dynamic R&D subsidies, see To sum up, both a carbon tax and a green research subsidy contribute to the climate change mitigation, as illustrated in Figure 2 (f). 8 The carbon tax has a direct eect on climate through its impact on the market price of the fossil fuel, but it has not indirect eect on the backstop sector. The green R&D subsidy rate has a direct eect on the backstop sector and thus an indirect eect on the fossil fuel use, because of substitutions between these two primary energy sources. the present value of this damage, i.e. the discounted sum of the instantaneous climate change costs, as expressed in USD, with a discount rate equal to the interest rate. We obtain the following ranking:
Eects on the output
Then, as already mentioned in the previous subsection, both a carbon tax and a green R&D subsidy are required to minimize the cost of global warming in terms of output (we will talk about the question of social costs later).
In Figure 3 (c), we analyze the losses and gains in GWP (i.e. in nal output), implied by the various public interventions, as compared with the laisser-faire case. First, whenever a positive carbon tax is levied, we can observe a loss for the earlier generations. Second, the larger the carbon tax is, the stronger this loss. Third, one can attenuate the output losses caused by the carbon tax and reach earlier the date at which gains will occur again, by increasing simultaneously the green research subsidy. Finally, the intergenerational eort can be smoothed if the planner uses less the tax and more the subsidy. However, in this case, the long run GWP gain reveals to be less important than the one implied by the use of the carbon tax alone. 
Eects on the welfare
We rst examine how consumption reacts when the policy tools vary. Figure 4 (a) works like gure 3(c) and gives the deviation in percents from the LF trajectory. We can remark some dierences between these two graphs, which are due to the impact of the carbon tax and the research subsidies on the various investments (in capital, in primary energy production and in R&D). As shown in gure 3(d), the general impacts of the environmental and research policies on the total investment (i.e. I + R E + R B + Q F + Q B ) are symmetric to the ones observed on the nal output. Moreover, they exhibit approximatively the same order of magnitude. Without going into detail, an increase in τ diminishes the total investment, essentially by increasing Q F ; simultaneously, an increase in σ B stimulates the total investment through its eect on R B and Q B whereas the eects of σ E reveal negligible.
As a result, the depressive eect on the nal output observed (essentially in the short run)
in the scenarios within a carbon tax is levied, is partially attenuated on the consumption by a decrease in the total investments.
Last, Figure 4 (b) gives some insights on the relative impacts of both the carbon tax and increase in the total welfare, with a slight shortening for the earlier generations and a raise for the future ones (cf. "SB1"); ii) without any ambiguity, an increase in σ E enhances the welfare for all generations (cf. "SB1" vs "SB2"); iii) an increase in σ B essentially augments the welfare of future generations (cf. "SB1" vs "SB3"). Finally, the gap between "FB" and "SB1" (resp. "SB4") measures the welfare loss caused by an absence of research subsidy in any R&D sector (resp. by a zero carbon tax). In a second-best world, a carbon tax used alone leads to a higher social cost (with respect to the rst-best) than a research policy alone. This result is due to the fact that, in the last case (a zero carbon tax), the impact of the research subsidies on the environmental is weak and it is overridden by the direct impact on the output (and its growth). This analyze illustrates that the objective of any policy (output, welfare, consumption, environment, ...) must be carefully dened. In the limit case where the objective turns on the climate, the basic public tool is the carbon tax; but it could lead to a welfare loss for early generations. On the contrary, by mainly focusing on the social welfare and the intergenerational equity, the question of the climate may be under-estimated.
Conclusion
We have conducted various second-best analysis in a general equilibrium climate change model with endogenous and dedicated R&D. To do that, we have characterized the set of equilibria in the decentralized economy, and we have imposed some institutional constraints on the policy tool(s): i) the impossibility to implement the rst-best carbon tax; ii) the impossibility to subsidize one or two R&D sectors. In each case, we have computed the second-best level of the remaining unconstrained tool(s). The second-best results have been compared with, on the upper side, the rst-best trajectories and, on the lower side, the laisser-faire ones. Those comparisons have allowed to appreciate the eects of each policy tool on the trajectories of the main following variables: fossil fuel extraction and price, backstop use and price, atmospheric carbon concentration, instantaneous damage, nal output. We have also illustrated the assessment of each tool in terms of social welfare gain with respect to the laisser-faire benchmark case.
The main results have highlighted the role of the research grants, in particular the backstop ones. The model shows that the best way to mitigate climate change is to implement a policy that combine both a carbon tax and a green research subsidy. However, the carbon tax penalizes the consumption and then, the welfare of earlier generations, whereas the research subsidy allows to spare them.
The associated rst order conditions are:
The transversality conditions are:
First, from (41), (42) and (50), we can write the following dierential equation:
Integrating this expression and using transversality condition (55), we obtain:
From (41) and (49), we have:μ
Using (54), the solution of such a dierential equation can be computed as:
Equations (48) and (53) imply:
Replacing into (42) λ, η, µ T and µ G by their expressions coming from (41), (56), (57) and (58), respectively, gives us the equation (34) of Proposition 1.
Second, equation (36) directly comes from condition (43). Next, log-dierentiating (41) and (44) with respect to time yields:λ
Combining (59) and (45) 
